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Comment
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN STATE AND
FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONALLY
GUARANTEED RIGHTS: A
PROBLEM OF THE
INDEPENDENT INTERPRETATION OF
STATE CONSTITUTIONS
Carol F. Peterkort*
This Comment categorizes the situations which may arise when state courts inter-
pret their own constitutions more expansively than the Supreme Court has inter-
preted analogous provisions in the federal Constitution. After reviewing several
possible solutionsformulated to determine the "Winner" in such conflicts, the author
concludes that only aflexible, sliding scale approach is adequate to resolve the array
offederalism problems likely to be presented To support this conclusion, the author
discusses the criticisms to which flexible balancing approaches are subject and de-
fends the sliding scale approach against the hopelessly vague standard applied in
obscenity cases.
INTRODUCTION
THROUGHOUT the history of this country, the source of pro-
tection of personal liberties has been the bill of rights of each
individual state. The state constitution was a citizen's only protec-
tion against overreaching by state government until the fourteenth
amendment was adopted in 1868.1 Historically, however, the
Supreme Court construed the fourteenth amendment so narrowly
as to render the federal Constitution ineffective in deterring state
infringement of individual liberties.2 During the 1960's, the War-
* A.B. (1976), Stanford University; J.D. (1981), Case Western Reserve University
School of Law. The author is an Associate in the law firm of Paine, Hamblen, Coffin &
Brooke, Spokane, Washington.
1. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal.
3d 528, 550-51, 531 P.2d 1099, 1113-14, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329-30 (1975); Falk, The State
Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 273, 273-74
(1973); Project Report: Toward an Activist Rolefor State Bills of Rights, 8 HAlv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 271, 277-79 (1973); Note, Expanding Criminal Procedural Rights Under State Con-
stitutions, 33 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 909, 910-11 (1976).
2. For the original statement of this principle, see Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
(16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See generally Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Indi-
vidual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 493 (1977); Douglas, State Judicial Activism-The
New Role for State Bills of Rights, 12 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 1123, 1127 (1978); Project Re-
port, supra note 1, at 280; Note, supra note 1, at 912.
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ren Court revolutionized this aspect of federal law Although the
application of the federal Bill of Rights guarantees to the states
began as early as 1925, through the process of incorporation into
the fourteenth amendment,4 it was not until the years 1962-1969
that the Supreme Court found the bulk of those guarantees to ap-
ply to the states exactly as they applied to the federal govern-
ment.- As a result, the federal Bill of Rights now bears the
primary responsibility for protecting the individual liberties of
United States citizens. Many commentators hailed this shift of
responsibility from the state to the federal Constitution as a neces-
sary and welcomed development. These commentators main-
tained that the states often had failed to recognize and enforce
their own bills of rights guarantees against state action. It also
seemed unsound to find that a fundamental right, enumerated in
the federal Bill of Rights and thus protected against infringements
by the federal government, could be ignored by a state govern-
ment.7 This expanded role of the federal Bill of Rights resulting
from the activism of the Warren Court during the 1960's now is
established firmly in American law. In addition, state courts are
accustomed to their new responsibility of interpreting and enforc-
ing the federal Bill of Rights guarantees against state
government.8
The 1970's evidenced another distinct trend in the develop-
ment of the relationship between state and federal constitutional
protection of individual liberties. Early in that decade, the Burger
Court demonstrated that it would not follow in the "activist" foot-
3. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Brennan, supra note 2, at 490-94; Henkin, "Selective Incorpora-
tion"in the Fourteenth Amendment, 73 YALE L. 74 (1963); Mosk, Contemporary Federal-
ism, 9 PAC. L.L 711, 713-14 (1978); Wilkes, The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure:
State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 Ky. L.J. 421, 422 (1974).
4. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). See generally Brennan, The Bill of
Rights and the States, 36 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761, 770 (1961).
5. See Project Report, supra note 1, at 281 n.53; Note, supra note 1, at 913.
6. See Project Report, supra note 1, at 283-84.
7. See, eg., Brennan, supra note 4, at 770; Countryman, Why a State Bill ofRights?,
45 WASH. L. REv. 454, 455-56 (1970); Cramton, The Supreme Court and State Power to
Deal with Subversion and Loyalty, 43 MINN. L. Rav. 1025, 1029 (1959); Paulsen, State
Constitutions, State Courts and First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REV. 620, 642
(1951).
8. See Howard, State Courts and Constitutional AR'ghts in the Day ofthe Burger Court,
62 VA. L. REv. 873, 879 (1976); Sunquist, Construction of the Wisconsin Constitu-
tion-Recurrence to Fundamental Princip1es, 62 MARQ. L. Rav. 531, 533-34 (1979).
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steps of its predecessor, the Warren Court.9 The Burger Court not
only abandoned the trend of the 1960's to expand the federal Bill
of Rights guarantees to cover more state action, but also specifi-
cally limited many of the expansive Warren Court decisions so as
to diminish their effectiveness as protectors of individual rights. 10
Many states were uncomfortable with the prospect of diminished
federal constitutional protection for the individual liberties of
their citizens. The Burger Court also openly encouraged a revival
of concern for the federalist structure of the federal government
and specifically urged the states to assume greater responsibility in
the protection of their citizens' liberties.'1
State courts were troubled by the Burger Court's "cramped"
interpretation of many Warren Court decisions and the prospect
of reduced federal protection of individual liberties, but they were
encouraged by the "new federalism" apparent in courts and com-
mentaries throughout the country. Many state courts, therefore,
began to interpret their own constitutions to provide greater pro-
tection of personal freedoms than that available under the federal
9. See Brennan, supra note 2, at 495-98; Dershowitz & Ely, Harris Y. New York:
Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon Majority, 80
YALE L.J. 1198 (1971); Mosk, supra note 3, at 714-17; Stephens, The Burger Court: New
Dimensions in Criminal Justice, 60 GEe. L.J. 249, 277-78 (1971); Wilkes, supra note 3, at
421-25; Project Report, supra note 1, at 271-72; Note, CivilRights in the Burger Court Era,
10 AKRON L. Rav. 327 (1976).
10. In the area of criminal procedural rights, see, e.g., Williams v. Florida, 424 U.S.
507 (1976) (approving a requirement to reveal alibi witnesses); Michigan v. Mosley, 423
U.S. 96 (1975) (statements made after suspect indicated he did not want to answer any
more questions admissible); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (statements made after
suspect expressed desire to consult with attorney admissible); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218 (1973) (full scale body search incident to custodial arrest upheld); Kirby v.
Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (counsel not required at station lineup occurring after arrest
but before indictment); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statements made without
Miranda warnings admissible to impeach accused's credibility).
In other areas of civil rights, see, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976)
(lower courts prohibited from annually redrawing school attendance zone lines to maintain
racial balance); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) (lower courts prohibited from
ordering interdistrict busing to achieve racial balance); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632 (1974) (sex not a suspect classification); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (indigency not a suspect classification and the right to educa-
tion not a constitutionally protected right); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163
(1972) (no discriminatory state action where private club, with state-issued liquor license,
refused to serve black guest).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 454 n.4 (1976) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 121 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477
(1972). See generally Note, supra note 9, at 352-53 (trend toward state enforcement and
protection of individual liberties discussed).
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Bill of Rights. 2 Although no state court may use its state consti-
tution to reduce protection of individual rights below the mini-
mum required under the federal Constitution,'" states legally may
enlarge their protection of individual liberties beyond the feder-
ally required minimum, based on an independent, expansive in-
terpretation of their own state bill of rights.14 The Supreme Court
repeatedly has sanctioned this state court technique.' 5  Justice
Marshall, and especially Justice Brennan, have actively en-
couraged state courts to construe their state constitutions indepen-
dently. 6 The list of states which have rediscovered and
independently interpreted their own bills of rights grows longer
each year. 7 The field of criminal rights has been an especially
fertile ground for the growth and development of this doctrine,' 8
12. Compare cases such as Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (A0aska 1974); Baker v. City of
Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me. 1974); State v.
Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972); People v. Beavers, 393 Mich. 554, 227 N.W.2d 511
(1975); South Dakota v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d 673 (S.D. 1976) in which state constitu-
tions were interpreted with cases interpreting the federal Constitution, such as United
States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); Harris v.
New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); United States v. white, 401 U.S. 745 (1971); Baldwin v.
New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970). See generally Galie
& Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Supreme Court Review: Justice Marshall's Pro-
posalin Oregon v. Hass, 82 DicK L. REv. 273,273-75 (1978); Howard, supra note 8; Mosk,
supra note 3; Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties: State Court Protection f Political and
Civil Rights, 10 GA. L. REv. 533 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Note, Of Laboratories and
Liberties]; Note, The New Federalisr Toward a Princpled Interpretation of the State Con-
stitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, The New Federalism].
13. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (1975); Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375,
399 (1955); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Falk, supra note I, at 280 n.29;
Note, supra note 9, at 351 n.152. See generally Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State
Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 750 (1972); Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L.
REV. 943 (1965); Project Report, supra note 1, at 312-15.
14. See Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 401-02 (Alaska 1970); People v.
Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 545-52, 531 P.2d 1099, 1110-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 326-31
(1975); State v. Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51, 58 n.6 (Hawaii 1974); State v. Doe, 78 Wis. 2d 161,
171, 254 N.W.2d 210, 215 (1977). See also Project Report, supra note 1, at 284-85 (states
encouraged to enlarge individual liberties, as the fourteenth amendment establishes only
minimum guarantees).
15. See, eg., Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714,719 (1975); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477,
489 (1972); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 60-61 (1968); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S.
58, 62 (1967).
16. See, eg., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 447 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 121 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Hass,
420 U.S. 714, 728 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Brennan, supra note 2.
17. The enumeration of cases which have employed this technique is too long to delin-
eate. For a sampling only, see supra note 12 and infra notes 18-19.
18. See, ag., Scott v. State, 519 P.2d 774 (Alaska 1974); Baker v. City of Fairbanks,
471 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1970); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal.
Rptr. 315 (1975); Kaplan v. Superior Court, 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649
(1971); State v. Santiago, 492 P.2d 657 (Hawaii 1971); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160 (Me.
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but protection of other individual liberties has been expanded as
well. 9 Although some commentators have serious problems with
state court construction of state constitutions to expand protection
of personal liberties beyond that required under the federal Con-
stitution,2" most authors hail the trend as a healthy infusion of
federalism into America's decidedly anemic federalist system of
government. The commentators believe the previous system has
promoted an imbalance of federal/state power and responsibility
which has favored the federal government. These commentators
welcome this brand of state court activism as a means of further-
ing the Warren Court's concern for strong, vibrant protection of
constitutional rights.21
Since this technique is still the exception rather than the rule,
the extent of its strengths, weaknesses, and boundaries have yet to
be discovered and analyzed fully.22 The Supreme Court recently
1974); State v. Collins, 297 A.2d 620 (Me. 1972); South Dakota v. Opperman, 247 N.W.2d
673 (S.D. 1976). For a discussion of the states' liberal construction of their constitutions'
guarantees for the rights of accused, see Howard, supra note 8, at 891-907; Wilkes, supra
note 3; Wilkes, More on the New Federalism in Criminal Procedure, 63 Ky. L.J. 873 (1975);
Note, The Independent Application of State Constitutional Pro visions to Questions of Crimi-
nal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L. REv. 596 (1979); Note, supra note 1.
19. See, e.g., Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975) (home marijuana use pro-
tected by state constitutional right of privacy); Breese v. Smith, 501 P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972)
(school hair-length regulations invalidated under state constitution's "liberty" guarantee);
Sail'er Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971) (sex found to
be suspect classification under state constitution); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473, 303
A.2d 273 (1973) (education found to be a fundamental right under state constitution). See
also Howard, supra note 8, at 873-91, 907-34 (state constitutional provisions regarding eco-
nomic regulation interpreted to give greater protection than that given under the federal
Constitution); Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties, supra note 12 (state constitutions inter-
preted as giving greater protection than federal Constitution in area of individual rights).
20. See, e.g., Bice, supra note 13; Galie & Galie, supra note 12; Note, State Constitu-
tional Guarantees as Adequate State Grounds: Supreme Court Review and Problems of Fed-
eralism, 13 AM. Caum. L. Rav. 737 (1976). Some of the most vocal critics have been
judges. See People v. Ramey, 16 Cal. 3d 263, 277-81, 545 P.2d 1333, 1341-44, 127 CaL
Rptr. 629, 637-40 (1976) (Clark, J., dissenting); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 118-21,
545 P.2d 272, 283-85, 127 CaL Rptr. 260, 271-73 (1976) (Richardson, J., dissenting); People
v. Norman, 14 Cal. 3d 929, 538 P.2d 237, 123 Cal. Rptr. 109 (1975) (Clark, J., dissenting).
21. See Countryman, supra note 7; Douglas, supra note 2; Falk, supra note 13; Force,
State "Bills ofRights''A Case of Neglect and the Needfor a Renaissance, 3 VAL. U.L. REv.
125 (1969); Howard, supra note 8; Morris, New Horizonsfor a State Bill of Rights, 45
WASH. L. REv. 478 (1970); Mosk, supra note 3; Wilkes, supra note 3; Wilkes, supra note 18;
Project Report, supra note 1; Note, Of Laboratories and Liberties, supra note 12; Note,
Rediscovering the Calfornia Declaration of Rights, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 481 (1974) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Note, Rediscovering].
22. Some of the potential trouble areas in the independent use of state constitutions to
expand protection of personal liberties beyond that required under the federal Constitution
have already been considered in the literature. For a discussion of the adequate state
ground doctrine, see Bice, supra note 13; Falk, supra note 13; Hill, supra note 13; Project
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illustrated one of the most interesting potential problems of the
technique in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins. 3
In certain situations, the Supreme Court has been faced with
direct conflicts between two federal constitutionally guaranteed
liberties and has been forced to strike a balance between them. To
strike this balance, the Court must weigh the various rights and
interests at stake in the particular conflict and enforce one pro-
tected liberty at the "expense" of the other.24 As more states inde-
pendently interpret their constitutions, it seems inevitable that
state court cases will arise presenting the same conflicts between
constitutionally protected liberties that the Supreme Court already
has addressed. In the state court cases, however, one of the con-
flicting liberties may be provided broader protection under the
state constitution than it was provided under the federal Constitu-
tion. Thus, there are several issues which must be considered, in-
cluding: whether state courts may reweigh the same conflicting.
liberties on the basis of a state constitution interpreted to provide
greater protection for one of those liberties than the federal Con-
stitution; whether a state court may strike a different balance,
finding the opposite right to be the weightier, in light of an expan-
sive interpretation of its own state constitution; whether such a
reweighing would infringe automatically a federal constitutional
provision; and, whether the conflict between a state guaranteed
liberty and a federal guaranteed liberty is inherently different than
a conflict between two analogous federally protected liberties,
thereby requiring the application of a different standard.
The dissenting opinion of the California Supreme Court in
Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center'5 confronted these issues
and concluded that state courts have no right to reweigh conflict-
ing individual liberties which the Supreme Court previously has
Report, supra note 1, at 312-15; Note, supra note 20. The desirability of various modes of
state constitutional interpretations is discussed in Sunquist, supra note 8; Note, supra note
12.
23. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
24. See, ag., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (press and
publie's first amendment rights to receive information balanced against an accused's sixth
amendment right to a fair trial); Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (first
amendment freedom of press balanced against sixth amendment right to a fair trial);
Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (first amendment freedom of
expression weighed against first and fifth amendments "penumbra" right of privacy in
one's home); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (first amendment free religious exer-
cise contrasted with first amendment anti-establishment of religion).
25. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
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determined in accordance with the federal Constitution.26 The
United States Supreme Court,27 however, affirmed the California
majority approach, which obviated the need to consider that prob-
lem. The resolutions which the Court would give to the foregoing
issues, therefore, were not defined in its PruneYard opinion.2"
This Comment portrays the problem more graphically through
the vehicle of the PruneYard case 9 and discusses several alterna-
tive approaches the Supreme Court may adopt in reviewing these
"rebalancing" cases. 30  Finally, the Comment outlines the best
approach.3'
I. THE PROBLEM: CONFLICTS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
In March of 1976, the Supreme Court decided Hudgeons v.
NLRB 32 which seemingly resolved the uncertainty generated by a
recent line of cases concerning conflicts between the constitution-
ally protected private property rights of large shopping mall own-
ers and the free speech rights of the general public.3 Hudgeons
presented a dispute between union-member employees, who
peacefully attempted to picket a retail store located on the prem-
ises of a large, privately owned shopping mall, and the owner of
the mall, who threatened to have the picketers arrested. One of
the issues the Supreme Court considered in Hudgeons was
whether the picketers had first amendment free speech rights to
herald their dispute on the private property of the shopping center
owner.34 In concluding that the picketers lacked such rights, the
Court emphasized that the earlier cases in this series, holding that
a speaker's first amendment rights outweighed the right of the
owner to exclude that speaker, were either strictly limited to their
facts35 or were overruled.36 The more recent case of Lloyd v. Tan-
26. Id. at 911-16, 592 P.2d at 348-51, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861-64.
27. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
28. This problem is intriguing and it is likely to present itself squarely before the
United States Supreme Court. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
29. See infra notes 32-68 and accompanying text.
30. See infra notes 73-89 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
32. 424 U.S. 507 (1976).
33. See Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Central Hardware Co. v. NLRB,
407 U.S. 539 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391
U.S. 308 (1968); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
34. 424 U.S. at 512-21.
35. Id See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
36. 424 U.S. at 518. See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley
Plaza, 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
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ner,37 however, was strongly reaffirmed in Hudgeons as good law
and binding precedent.38 Lloyd upheld the right of the owner of a
large shopping center to forbid, under threat of arrest, the distri-
bution of handbills on shopping mall property by a group of indi-
viduals opposing the draft and the United States' military
involvement in Vietnam.
In light of Lloyd and Hudgeons, the 1979 California Supreme
Court decision in Robins v. Prune Yard Shopping Center39 was sur-
prising. The court in Robins confronted a factual scenario almost
identical to that faced by the United States Supreme Court seven
years earlier in Lloyd. In Robins, several high school students had
attempted to gather signatures for a petition expressing opposition
to a United Nations' resolution against Zionism on the PruneYard
Mall premises and were asked to leave under threat of arrest. Al-
though the United States Supreme Court had held for the private
property owner on similar facts, the California Supreme Court
held for the students.' The unexpected result was based on an
expansive application of the California Constitution.
California has been a leader in the independent use of its state
constitution to protect the individual liberties of its citizens4 and
has unequivocal precedent holding that its constitution protects
free speech more than the federal Constitution.42 It is undisputed
that California has a right, on the basis of its own constitution, to
afford its citizens greater protection of free speech rights than is
afforded under the United States Constitution.43 It also is equally
clear that California may not abridge its citizens' rights under the
37. 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
38. 424 U.S. at 517-18.
39. 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
40. Id. at 910, 592 P.2d at 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
41. See, e.g., Serranno v. Priest, 18 Cal. 3d 728, 557 P.2d 929, 135 Cal. Rptr. 345
(1977); People v. Disbrow, 16 Cal. 3d 101, 545 P.2d 272, 127 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1976); People
v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 531 P.2d 1099, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315 (1975); People v. Anderson,
6 Cal. 3d 628,493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972); Sairer Inn, Inc. v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1,
485 P.2d 529, 95 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1971); Cardenas v. Superior Court, 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363
P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
See generally Mosk, supra note 3; Project Report, supra note 1, at 324-26; Note, Rediscover-
ing, supra note 21; Note, The New Federalism, supra note 12, at 300-02.
42. See Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d at 908-10, 592 P.2d at 346-
47, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60; Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116,
120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975).
43. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text.
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federal Constitution.' In Robins, the shopping center owner ar-
gued that Lloyd recognized federally protected private property
rights which outweighed the free speech rights of the handbillers
and that Lloyd established, under those facts, afederal minimum
level of protection for private property rights. Thus, the owner
maintained that the federal supremacy clause compelled a ruling
in his favor. To hold otherwise would be to infringefederaly pro-
tected private property rights by falling below the minimum level
of protection required by Lloyd.4"
The dissenters in the 4-3 California Supreme Court opinion
agreed.46 This group noted language in the Lloyd opinion which
strongly suggested that the Court had recognized federally pro-
tected private property rights and had weighed those property
rights against the handbillers' free speech rights with the balance
tipping in favor of the former.47 It was considered irrelevant,
therefore, that the California Constitution provided broader free
speech guarantees than the federal Constitution.
The controlling import of the supremacy clause on the issue
before us is readily apparent. The United States Supreme
Court, interpreting the United States Constitution, has declared
that an owner of a private shopping center ... has a property
right protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
which is superior to the First Amendment right of those who
come upon the shopping center premises for purposes unrelated
to the center. In such cases, no state court, interpreting a state
Constitution, including this court interpreting the California
Constitution, can contravene such a federal constitutionally
protected right. Thus, in this case, the majority is prevented
from relying on the California Constitution to impair or inter-
fere with those property rights. We are bound by the United
States Supreme Court interpretations of the United States Con-
stitution. More specifically, in a confrontation between federal
and state constitutional interests, federally protected property
rights recognized by the United States Supreme Court will pre-
vail against state protected free speech interests.48
The Robins dissent noted that the majority avoided the troub-
lesome supremacy clause problem by relying on a wholly different
44. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
45. Respondent's Brief in Response to Amicus Curiae Briefs at 21-35, Robins v.
PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1979).
46. 23 Cal. 3d at 911-16, 592 P.2d at 348-51, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861-64 (Richardson, J.,
dissenting).
47. Id. at 913-14, 592 P.2d at 349-50, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
48. Id. at 914-15, 592 P.2d at 350, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
[Vol. 32:158
INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS
interpretation of the Lloyd opinion. 9 The majority thought that
Lloyd did not identify special property rights protected by the fed-
eral Constitution and that the "court in Lloyd examined the func-
tions performed by Lloyd's center but did not purport to define
the nature or scope of Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights of
shopping center owners generally."5 According to the majority,
Lloyd was "primarily a First Amendment case,"'51 holding only
that speech on the property of a privately owned shopping center
was simply not covered by the federal first amendment free speech
guarantee. In that situation, California was free to find that its
more expansive constitutional free speech guarantee protected the
signature gatherers' activities on the privately owned shopping
mall property even though similar activity under only the federal
Constitution would be unprotected.
If the majority were correct in its reading of Lloyd, then its
holding in Robins would be proper, based on the broader protec-
tions provided under the California constitution. If the dissent's
reading of Lloyd were correct, and Lloyd in fact represented a
recognition by the United States Supreme Court of federally pro-
tected property rights which outweighed the Lloyd handbillers'
federal free speech rights, state courts might be compelled by the
supremacy clause to hold for the property owner in a Rob-
ins/Lloyd fact situation. There is arguably a third approach: the
dissent's reading of Lloyd does not compel an automatic defense
for the shopping center owners.
Even assuming Lloyd did weigh federally protected property
rights against federally protected free speech rights and found that
the property rights outweighed the free speech rights under the
federal Constitution, it does not follow that the same balance nec-
essarily will be struck when the free speech right being asserted is
a state constitutional right. The state interest asserted in Lloyd
was the protection of its citizens'federal free speech rights, but in
the Robins situation, the state interest was in the protection of its
citizens' more expansive state free speech rights. This distinction
introduces several factors not present in Lloyd-factors which
possibly could add new weight to the state's interests.
The determination, for example, that the California Constitu-
tion has been interpreted repeatedly and decisively to protect free
49. Id. at 911-16, 592 P.2d at 348-51, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 861-64.
50. Id. at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
51. Id.
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speech more than the federal Constitution52 is a significant consid-
eration. The most important factor in considering conflicts be-
tween state and federal constitutions is the relative "importance"
of the rights involved. A state or federal right that is highly cher-
ished and strongly protected logically is "weightier" than a less
fiercely guarded liberty. An expanded state constitutional right,
therefore, would seem, prima facie, to be weightier than its less
broad, less strongly protected federal counterpart. Furthermore,
states' strong interest in interpreting and enforcing their own state
constitutional law is a factor which favors allowing the states con-
siderable deference in defining the limits of their own constitu-
tional provisions.53 Finally, conditions peculiar to California
could strengthen its argument that broader state free speech rights
and interests outweigh the federally protected private property
rights of large shopping center owners. California, for example,
could note that its cities' central business districts-the public
parks and streets which were once the traditional free speech fo-
rum of California citizens-have been replaced by large privately
owned suburban shopping centers and that most California citi-
zens satisfy most of their commercial needs by traveling from their
homes to a privately owned shopping complex without ever
touching public soil.54 California also could stress the important
role citizen petitions play in the California constitutional scheme,
and the state's initiative, referendum, and recall processes.55
It is arguable that the supremacy clause would not be violated
by a reweighing of the shopping center'sfederall protected pri-
vate property rights and the California public's state protected
free speech rights because, even under the Robins dissent, Lloyd
did not decide that issue. Lloyd did not weigh those rights and
interests or establish a federal minimum for the protection of
property rights that conflict with a state's more broadly protected
constitutional free speech rights.
On June 9, 1980, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the California Supreme Court's decision in PruneYard Shopping
52. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
53. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's self-imposed adequate state ground
doctrine. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); Note, supra note 20, at
739; infra note 73.
54. This argument was addressed by the court at 23 Cal. 3d at 907, 592 P.2d at 345,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
55. See id. at 907-08, 592 P.2d at 345, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 858 for the court's discussion of
this argument.
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Center v. Robins. 6 The Court's answer to the question of how, or
indeed whether, state courts should reweigh directly conflicting
state and federal constitutional rights-rights which under the
federal Constitution alone have been balanced by the Supreme
Court-was not resolved. The Supreme Court apparently agreed
with the California majority's interpretation of the Lloyd decision
as "primarily a First Amendment case.",57 Justice Rehriquist,
writing for the majority, stated that "Lloyd held that when a shop-
ping center owner opens his private property to the public for the
purpose of shopping, the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution does not thereby create individual rights in expres-
sion beyond those already existing under applicable law."5 8 The
Court treated Lloyd as holding only that the federal free speech
guarantee does not extend to protect speech on private property.
The Supreme Court, therefore, reafTirmed California's "sovereign
right to adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more
expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution,"59
with the qualification that its restrictions on an owner's private
property use "not amount to a taking without just compensation
or contravene any other federal constitutional provision."6 The
opinion concludes that the PruneYard owner's property had not
been taken without just compensation 6' nor had the owner's fed-
eral free speech rights been infringed by requiring him to allow
speakers with whom he disagreed to express themselves on his pri-
vate property. 2
The issue remains whether the result would have been differ-
ent had Lloyd been a case which identified special property rights
in the shopping center owner-rights that outweighed the free
speech rights of the handbillers under the federal Constitution.
Justice Rehnquist stated: "Our reasoning in Lloyd. .. does not
ex proprio vigore limit the .. .sovereign right [of the State] to
adopt in its own Constitution individual liberties more expansive
than those conferred by the Federal Constitution. '63 Justice
56. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
57. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
58. 447 U.S. at 81.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 84-85.
62. Justice Rehniquist emphasized that "the shopping center by choice of its owners
was not limited to the personal use" of the owners who were free to post signs disclaiming
the handbiller's views. Id. at 87-88.
63. Id. at 8 1.
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Rehnquist could make such a statement since Lloyd was "prima-
rily a First Amendment case,"'  and states may, in their discre-
tion, expand first amendment protections. A more difficult
problem would have been raised if the Lloyd case had balanced
the shopping center owner's rights against the handbiller's rights
of free speech. The Court then would-have had to choose between
ruling in favor of the PruneYard owner on the basis of the
supremacy clause and balancing a federally protected right
against a more expansive state right. The Robins/Lloyd situation
allowed the Court to sidestep this perplexing issue, but it seems
inevitable that future cases will arise presenting similar, unavoida-
ble conflicts between federal and state constitutions.
A state court, for example, could interpret its own constitu-
tional bill of rights as protecting the rights of an accused to a fair
trial more than the federal Constitution and on that basis, uphold
a judicial gag order imposed on the press in a criminal trial.
Under the federal Constitution alone, this ruling would be uncon-
stitutional. In Nebraska v. Stuart,6" the Supreme Court found that
the press and the public's first amendment free press rights and
interests outweighed the accused's sixth amendment rights and in-
terests in being assured a fair trial. Whether that same result
would follow when federal free press rights are weighed against a
state's more expansive interests in assuring its accused citizens a
fair trial is still unresolved. Another such issue is whether a state
constitution can be interpreted as protecting its citizens' free exer-
cise of religion to a greater extent than the federal Constitution,
leading a state court to uphold legislation providing for direct
state funding of teacher salaries in both public schools and relig-
iously affiliated private schools.66 Under the federal Constitution,
this interpretation would be unconstitutional. While the situation
described presents a conflict between the free exercise clause and
the establishment clause of the first amendment, the Supreme
64. 23 Cal. 3d at 904, 592 P.2d at 343, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 856.
65. 427 U.S. 539 (1976). The Supreme Court of Nebraska did not hold specifically the
state right should prevail over the federal one, but that "[t]he constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech and of the press and of the right to trial by an impartial jury are, in our
judgment, the same under both Constitutions ... and there is no need to differentiate
between the two." State v. Simants, 194 Neb. 783, 790, 236 N.W.2d 794, 799 (1975). The
United States Supreme Court reversed this decision, which the Stuart court relied on, be-
cause it believed that the burden of showing a sufficient reason to institute prior restraint of
the press had not been met at the trial.
66. Such funding arguably protects one's free religious exercise by making it as eco-
nomical to attend a school affiliated with a religion, as to attend a secular public school.
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Court, in Lemon v. Kurtzman,67 held that, under such facts, the
establishment clause takes precedence. The question remains,
however, as to the proper result where a state has chosen, via its
state constitution, to protect its citizens' free religious exercise
rights to a greater extent than the federal Constitution. The state's
interests in enforcing its consititutional provision arguably could
alter the balance struck by the Supreme Court between the con-
flicting federal rights.
As more states interpret their own constitutions to provide
greater protection for individual liberties than is available under
the federal Bill of Rights, it is more likely that state constitution-
ally guaranteed liberties will present serious conflicts with federal
constitutionally guaranteed rights.63 May state courts reweigh
rights and interests, previously weighed by the Supreme Court
under the federal Constitution, in light of conflicting state consti-
tutional provisions? Must the state show a compelling state inter-
est in protecting its citizens' state constitutional rights to find that
the state rights outweigh the conflicting federal constitutional
right, or is some lesser standard appropriate? On review, how
strictly should the Supreme Court scrutinize a state court's
rebalancing of conflicting state and federal constitutional guaran-
tees previously balanced only under the federal Constitition?
Since it will be important to answer these questions, the develop-
ment of a rational policy for resolving such future constitutional
conflicts is in order.
H. SOME POSSIBLE APPROACHES
There are at least three possible approaches that could be used
to handle the future constitutional conflicts discussed in this Com-
67. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
68. There are other indications as well. Commentators have begun to urge state courts
to expansively interpret their state constitutions to provide greater protection for those indi-
vidual liberties which they feel the Burger Court has inadequately protected. One commen-
tator, for example, urges state courts to provide expanded state constitutional protection for
the press' and public's right to receive information about current criminal trials so as to
constitutionally ensure that all state criminal trial proceedings be open, regardless of the
Supreme Court's ruling in Gannett v. DePasquale, 433 U.S. 368 (1979) (finding no absolute
sixth amendment right of the public to attend criminal trials and upholding the closure of a
criminal pretrial suppression hearing), or any other subsequent Supreme Court treatment
of that issue. Note, The R'ght of the Pres.rs andPublic to Attend Criminal Trial Proceedings
in Iowa, 66 IowA L. Rav. 153 (1980). That author, however, fails to recognize that by so
interpreting a state constitution, an accused's federal sixth amendment right to a fair trial is
definitely implicated and possibly infinged.
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ment.69 The first approach is to allow the state courts to enforce a
state constitutional guarantee over a conflicting federally guaran-
teed right with no provision for Supreme Court review.70 The sec-
ond possibility is to mandate that the Supreme Court use either
minimal scrutiny or strict scrutiny.7' Finally, the Supreme Court
could use a sliding-scale approach-the solution recommended by
this Comment.72
A. No-Scrutiny
There are two different justifications for a state court's absolute
right to decide, without Supreme Court review, that a state consti-
tutional guarantee will be enforced over a conflicting federally
guaranteed right. Neither justification is legally sound or persua-
sive. The first justification is rooted in the adequate state ground
doctrine, which is a self-imposed Supreme Court jurisdictional
limit. Since the Court generally has no power to review a state
court interpretation of state law, and because, as a general policy,
the Court declines to decide issues not necessary for the outcome
of the case before it, the Supreme Court has refused to review any
state court decision which is based on "adequate and independ-
ent" state grounds, even though the state decision may address a
question of federal law.73 It could be argued, therefore, that a
state decision balancing state constitutionally protected rights
against conflicting federal constitutionally protected rights is
based on state constitutional law, and under the adequate state
ground doctrine, should not be reviewed by the Supreme Court.
This approach would be an inappropriate response to the
problem of conflicting state and federal constitutional rights. The
adequate state ground doctrine protects a state court decision
from Supreme Court review when based on state law but not
when the state court interpretation of state law infringes on feder-
ally guaranteed rights.7 4 The heart of the issue in these conflicts is
whether federally guaranteed rights have been infringed. It is un-
69. See supra notes 1-68 and accompanying text.
70. See infra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
71. See infra notes 82-89 and accompanying text.
72. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
73. Seegeneraly Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Rd. Comm'n, 379 U.S. 487 (1965); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945); Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875);
C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 542-49 (3d ed. 1976). See also
supra note 22.
74. See supra note 13. See also supra note 40.
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questionably the duty of the Supreme Court to ensure that such
infringement does not occur.
There is a possible second justification for a no-scrutiny ap-
proach to this problem. States have been allowed to restrict their
citizens' exercise of federally guaranteed liberties when there is a
"compelling" state interest involved." Arguably, the protection
and enforcement of a state's constitutional guarantees of individ-
ual liberty are always compelling, thereby justifying restrictions
on federally guaranteed rights. This approach, however, also is
inappropriate. Any state could pass legislation on the basis of its
"compelling" state interest in protecting its state constitutionally
guaranteed liberties, even if these state rights severely infringed on
the federal constitutional rights of others. Taking the Robins sce-
nario to its logical extreme, for example, California could consti-
tutionally pass legislation requiring private homeowners to allow
the general public to use their front yards as a forum for free ex-
pression. California's compelling state interest in protecting its
citizens' expansive free speech rights under its state constitution
could justify the severe restriction of the homeowner's federally
guaranteed private property and free speech rights-an unaccept-
able .result from the perspective of even the most ardent states'
rights advocate.
In Robins, the Supreme Court implicitly rejected both of these
approaches. The Court affirmed the California decision, but did
not mechanically apply the adequate state ground doctrine. The
Court did not find that California's interest in enforcing its expan-
sive constitutional free speech provision was automatically com-
pelling. On the contrary, the Court carefully considered whether
the California Supreme Court infringed the PruneYard owner's
fifth amendment rights by enforcing its own expansive free speech
provision and taking his private property without just compensa-
tion.76 The Court also considered whether the owner's 'first
75. See, ag., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S.
449,463 (1958); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234,265 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring). Other terms also have been used to characterize this high level of governmental
interest including "substantial, subordinating, paramount, cogent, strong." United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). The Court has stated that it considers these terms
functionally equivalent. See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 n.9 (1973). See generally
Note, Of Interests, Fundamental and Compelling: The Emerging Constitutional Balance, 57
B.U.L. REv. 462 (1977) (discusses the compelling state interest which must be shown before
a state may infringe on individual rights which the Supreme Court has found to be more
important than other rights).
76. See suara note 61.
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amendment free speech rights were infringed by requiring him to
allow others to express themselves on his private property. 7
The Supreme Court will adopt neither of the two foregoing
no-scrutiny rationales when confronted by a possible infringement
of federally guaranteed rights. A very different no-scrutiny ap-
proach, however, could be employed by the Supreme Court in sit-
uations where the conflicting constitutional liberties were bal-
anced previously by the Court under only the federal Constitu-
tion. Robins did not present this situation. In Robins, the Court
found that Lloyd did not balance federal free speech rights against
federal property rights.7" If such balancing had occurred, the no-
scrutiny approach of the California Supreme Court dissenters
could have been adopted. The dissent found79 that Lloyd defined
specific federal property rights which had been balanced by the
United States Supreme Court against federal free speech rights,
and consequently, the supremacy clause of the United States Con-
stitution compelled a decision in favor of the PruneYard owner.8 0
Using this analysis, the Supreme Court would, in all cases, pro-
hibit state courts from reweighing constitutional rights previously
balanced by the Court under the federal Constitution, even when
the new balance would be between state and federal constitutional
rights and not between the two corresponding federal rights.
In the recent case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,81
for example, the Supreme Court balanced two conflicting federal
rights and determined, on the narrow facts of that case, that the
press' and public's first amendment right to receive information
about criminal trial proceedings outweighed the accused's sixth
amendment right to be assured an impartial jury. On that basis,
the Court declared that the press and public constitutionally could
not be denied access to the criminal trial at issue in that case.
Under the no-scrutiny approach discussed above, the minimum
level of first amendment protection defined in Richmond along
with supremacy clause of the Constitution would indicate that no
state constitution could serve as the basis for a scheme allowing
for trial closures even slightly more often than would be allowed
under the federal Constitution. This result would occur even
77. See supra note 62.
78. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
79. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d at 911-16, 592 P.2d at 348-51,
153 Cal. Rptr. at 861-64.
80. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
81. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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though the state-specific interests in expanding protections for its
criminally accused citizens arguably may be weightier than the
interests which support the less broad federal level of protection.
This third type of no-scrutiny seems to be an equally inappro-
priate approach to a state court's reweighing of conflicting state
and federal constitutional provisions. "Minimums," by definition,
exist only in relation to something else. A constitutional mini-
mum usually is applied in relation to other competing rights
and/or interests which are presented by the specific fact patterns
confronting the court. The minimum established in Richmond,
for example, is the minimum which governs conflict between
federal first amendment rights and federal sixth amendment
rights, not federal first amendment rights and broader state consti-
tutional rights. The supremacy clause, therefore, would not be vi-
olated by a state court's rebalancing of that latter set of rights.
The Supreme Court did not establish the law in that new situa-
tion. When the state's constitutional rights and the state's interests
in enforcing its constitutional provisions are factored into the bal-
ance, the result may not weigh in favor of the state's constitutional
rights.
B. Two-Tiered Scrutiny
The Supreme Court could characterize cases, in which state
courts reweigh conflicting state and federal constitutional guaran-
tees in favor of their own constitutional provisions, as requiring
either minimal scrutiny, under which most such state decisions
would survive, or strict scrutiny, under which few would survive.
Following a minimal scrutiny approach, the Supreme Court
would show deference to state court judgments and require only
rationality in the state court's reasons, analysis, and process of bal-
ancing.8 2 Strict scrutiny would require the state's interest in pro-
tecting its citizens' state constitutional rights to be compelling and
to be furthered by the least restrictive means possible.8 3
Arguing on the side of strict scrutiny, it must be noted that the
82. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963) (classic application of the Court's
minimal scrutiny approach to economic regulation). See generally L. TRE, AMERICAN
CONSTUTIONAL LAW 450-51 (1978) (discussing the Court's abandonment of its Lochmer
stance and its adoption of a policy of deference to state economic legislation).
83. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 133, 155 (1973) (explicitly applying strict scrutiny).
See generally L. TRiBE, spra note 82, at 602-03 (compelling state interest and close nexus
between means and ends required to justify state regulation of communicative impact of
speech).
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individual liberties protected by the federal Constitution usually
occupy a "preferred position" in Supreme Court adjudication. 4
A strict scrutiny approach, therefore, is appropriate when those
expressly guaranteed individual liberties allegedly have been in-
fringed by state action. Furthermore, state infringement of a fed-
erally guaranteed individual liberty arguably should be treated
the same, regardless of whether the alleged infringement is based
on a state interest in health, safety, or enforcing its citizens' state
constitutional rights. In all of these cases, the scrutiny should be
strict. An important argument for strict scrutiny is that the appli-
cation of minimal scrutiny could cause serious erosions in the ef-
fectiveness of federal protection of Bill of Rights freedoms. The
federal minimum levels of protection established by the Supreme
Court could be circumvented too easily by rebalancing the federal
right against a more expansive state constitutional right and by
reciting rational reasons for weighing the state's own constitu-
tional provision more heavily than the federal counterpart.
There are also numerous and weighty considerations which
support using minimal scrutiny instead of strict scrutiny. First,
there are historical arguments. Only within the last twenty years
has the federal Constitution been employed significantly to protect
individual liberties from state infringement. Previously, the states
bore that responsibility.85 It is arguable that the trend toward in-
dependent, expansive interpretations of state constitutions is a
healthy shift toward restoring the states' historic responsibility in
this area, and that minimal scrutiny in cases reweighing conflict-
ing federal and state constitutional rights is a proper extension of
that trend.
The strongest arguments in favor of minimal scrutiny of state
court decisions which reblance conflicting state and federal con-
84. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
85. See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text. See also P. BATOR, P. MISKIN, D.
SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FED-
ERAL SYSTEM 359 (2d ed. 1973) (quoting Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdic-
tion of Federal Courts: .An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362 (1953): "In the
scheme of the Constitution, they [state courts] are the primary guarantors of constitutional
rights, and in many cases they may be the ultimate ones." Id. at 1401). Brennan, supra
note 18, at 501-02 (independently interpreted state bills of rights were primary restraint on
state action before fourteenth amendment adopted); Project Report, supra note 1, at 303-04
(notes the Burger Court's return, after the aberrant Warren Court years, to the historical
pattern of leaving matters of criminal procedure to the states); Note, supra note 20, at 737
(throughout most of the nation's history, the protection of defendant's rights was a state
responsibility).
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stitutional provisions are structural. Deference should be shown
to state court resolution of these conflicts because it would en-
courage the revived "new federalism" trend86 recently apparent in
court decisions and legal commentary.87 Several Supreme Court
Justices have argued for a lively federalist approach to the protec-
tion of the individual liberties of United States citizens. These Jus-
tices contend that it would be better if the individual states were
not bound by one federal standard of protection. These Justices
recognize that states have different priorities, needs, and traditions
which would be served better by allowing for some constitutional
variations among the states.88 It also has been argued that state
constitutional experimentation and innovation should be en-
couraged and that state court resolution of these conflicts could
serve as "laboratory experiments" from which other states and the
Supreme Court could gain understanding of the practical implica-
tions of upholding one constitutional right at the expense of an-
other.8 9 State courts are particularly appropriate forums for trying
innovative constitutional law because their constitutions are easier
to amend than the federal Constitution. State courts thus can af-
ford more boldness than the Supreme Court. Finally, state courts
are more responsive to local values, priorities, and needs. Their
86. Most commentators take this position. See supra note 21. For discussion of "new
federalism," see Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (defining "Our Federalism" not
as blind deference to states' rights, but as a system sensitive to the legitimate interests of
both the state and federal governments); People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528, 550-52, 531
P.2d 1099, 1113-15, 119 Cal. Rptr. 315, 329-31 (1975) ("federalism" defined as the notion
that "the nation as a whole is comprised of distinct geographical and political entities
bound together by a fundamental federal law but nonetheless independently responsible
for safeguarding the rights of their citizens").
87. See supra note 11.
88. See, e.g., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (Burger, CJ., concurring); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Justice Harlan was probably the strong-
est advocate that state and federal standards of constitutional protection should not be
joined. See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 616-17 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring);
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
89. Several Justices have actively encouraged state court experimentation and innova-
tion. See, eg., Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 376 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring);
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 171-72 (1970) (Burger, C.J., concurring); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); New State Ice Co. v. Liebman,
285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); F. FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS
GOVERNMENT 49-51 (1930). The Supreme Court itself occasionally has examined state
court "experiments" for guidance. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 27 n.1, 40-
41 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); Id. at 57 n.21, 59-61 (Powell, J., concurring in result);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S, 78, 134-43 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643, 651-52 (1961); Mosk, supra note 3; Project Report, supra note I, at 290-93.
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determinations as to the weight of the state's rights and interests at
stake in a given conflict are likely to be more accurate than a fed-
eral court's determination.
The argument also could be made that federalist concerns
have been served sufficiently by allowing states, without any
Supreme Court review, to use their own constitutions to expand
protection of personal liberties beyond that required under the
federal Constitution when such expansion does not conflict with
express federal constitutional provisions. Strict scrutiny may be
the proper standard to insure the prevention of further erosion of
established federal minimum levels of protection.
III. SLIDING SCALE SCRUTINY: A RECOMMENDED APPROACH
There is no theory under which the Supreme Court could justi-
fiably fail to scrutinize a state court's resolution of conflicting fed-
eral and state rights.90 Moreover, the strict scrutiny and minimal
scrutiny approaches each present difficulties. Strict scrutiny ig-
nores important historic and current federalist concerns,9' while
minimal scrutiny presents the disturbing prospect of state courts
easily diluting federal constitutional guarantees of individual lib-
erty whenever such federal guarantees conflict with a state consti-
tutional guarantee.92
Perhaps a more appropriate approach would be a case-by-case
determination of the proper level of scrutiny based on the specific
facts, rights, and interests of the case. In state court cases that
reweigh conflicting state and federal constitutional rights, the state
court's determination of the proper result would be given minimal
scrutiny. In other cases, state court decisions would be subject to a
stricter, more critical scrutiny. This stricter scrutiny would re-
quire: 1) that the state articulate its interests in enforcing its own
constitutional provision; 2) that the state demonstrate that those
interests would be furthered significantly by a ruling in favor of
the state constitution; and most importantly, 3) that the state's
constitutionally protected rights and interests actualo, outweigh
the federal rights and interests at stake.
Sliding down the scrutiny scale, state court decisions would be
reviewed less critically, and their results would be given increasing
deference. Sliding up the scale, state courts would be required- to
90. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
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show more clearly that the state's rights and interests actually out-
weigh the federal rights and interests. Furthermore, it also must
be shown that those clearly articulated interests would be fur-
thered by a result in favor of the state constitutional provision. As
a result, at the stricter scrutiny end of the scale, close calls always
would be made in favor of the federal Constitution. At the mini-
mal scrutiny end of the scale, state courts would be given some
flexibility in deciding those cases with an eye toward the best in-
terests of their particular state.
There are two major factors to consider in determining the ap-
propriate level of scrutiny to apply in a given case. First, it should
be determined which federal right has been outweighed under the
state court's ruling. The Supreme Court, under the federal Con-
stitution, traditionally has protected some guaranteed liberties
more than others. State-imposed prior restraints on the press, for
example, are given more scrutiny than state regulation of the use
of private property.93 State regulation of political speech receives
stricter scrutiny than state regulation of commercial speech.94 A
state court decision which allegedly has infringed federal constitu-
tional guarantees of free political speech or freedom of the press,
therefore, should receive stricter scrutiny on review than one
which allegedly has infringed on federally guaranteed free com-
mercial speech rights.
Secondly, the strength of the state court's justification for an
expansive interpretation of the state constitution in the particular
case should be a factor influencing the level of scrutiny on review.
If the state constitutional provision has language that is identical,
or nearly identical, to that of the federal constitution, and if there
is no state precedent for such a holding, then it would seem likely
93. Compare New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per
curiam) ("system of prior restraint of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity" and thus, the state "carries a heavy burden of
showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint") with Village of Euclid v.
Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) ("before the [zoning] ordinance can be de-
clared unconstitutional, [it must be found] that such provisions are clearly arbitrary and
unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare"). See also Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15
HASTINGS LJ. 135 (1963), who notes that the history of the law of private ownership in the
United States has witnessed a trend toward less concern as to absolute property rights and
more concern as to the social and civil rights effects of property ownership.
94. Compare Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (invalidating on first amendment
grounds both a statutory limitation on a political candidate's ability to spend his or her
own personal funds and a ceiling on overall campaign expenditures) with Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979) (state statute prohibiting use of trade names by optometrists
upheld as a constitutionally permissible regulation).
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that the state is attempting to avoid the federal constitutional min-
imum by finding it in conflict with the expanded state constitu-
tional guarantee. Greater scrutiny would be appropriate in this
situation. In contrast, the language of some state constitutions un-
equivocally indicates that the language was intended to provide
expanded protection for certain personal liberty guarantees. Nu-
merous cases support this interpretation of the constitutional lan-
guage.9 5 This factor would seem to require lesser scrutiny on
review, since the state's expanded interpretation of its own consti-
tution is likely to have been made in good faith.96
In addition to the two main factors discussed above, stricter
scrutiny also should be applied whenever a good reason exists for
suspecting that the state court's primary aim in reaching its result
was to avoid a disapproved federal constitutional minimum.
Cases which deal with highly controversial issues, such as abor-
tion or school desegregation, for example, should be scrutinized
more closely. Many states have strongly and openly criticized the
Supreme Court's recent treatment of these highly charged issues,
and such states, consequently, seem likely to attempt to avoid the
decisions they disfavor.
The presence of the above factors should mandate an ex-
tremely strict review of state decisions reweighing conflicting state
and federal constitutional guarantees. Deference is inappropriate
when, based on an unprecedented interpretation of its own consti-
tution, a state allegedly infringes a federal Bill of Rights guarantee
and succeeds in diluting the effectiveness of a controversial
Supreme Court decision. In such situations, it seems entirely
proper to require that the state delineate clearly, and in good faith,
its interests in the conflict and also demonstrate that those inter-
ests will be furthered by a decision in its favor. In addition, the
state court should be required to properly balance and present in-
95. California's state constitutional free speech provision is such an example. See
supra note 42. See also Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975); Breese v. Smith, 501
P.2d 159 (Alaska 1972); Ellison v. State, 383 P.2d 716 (Alaska 1963); People v. Anderson, 6
Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972). See generally Project Report, supra
note 1, at 315-17, 319.
96. Even when the texts of the state and federal constitutions are identical, the state
may have strong precedent interpreting that language to guarantee greater protection than
its federal counterpart. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340 (Alaska 1969); State v.
Kaluna, 520 P.2d 51 (Hawaii 1974). See generally Project Report, supra note 1, at 318-19.
In these situations, since good faith again seems evident, something less than the strictest
scrutiny probably would be appropriate.
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terests which seem to outweigh the federal interests at stake in the
controversy.
Alternatively, as these factors disappear or become weak, the
argument for increased deference gains strength. The arguments
for a strong federalist system to protect the individual liberties of
United States citizens suggest that state courts should decide these
cases from their own state viewpoint. When the support for a
state's expanded interpretation of its own constitution is strong,
the federal guarantee allegedly infringed traditionally has re-
ceived something less than strict scrutiny. At the most, only ra-
tionality should be required in their analyses and judgments.
Sliding scale scrutiny has several advantages. Without unduly
limiting a state's ability to expand protections of individual liber-
ties beyond those embodied in the federal Constitution, it none-
theless allows the Supreme Court to control and monitor that
process. Federal constitutional minimums thus remain well-
guarded, while the arguments for expanding the recent trend to-
ward a more federalist system of protecting constitutional free-
doms are not ignored. This approach allows the Court to give
some deference to state court determinations when it is evident
that the state constitution has been interpreted expansively in
good faith, and when the federally protected right in question will
not be rendered ineffective. The approach also allows the Court
to examine critically the balancing process undertaken by a state
court when the federal right at issue is a particularly cherished
freedom or when the case presents a current controversial issue.
The Court also can scrutinize carefully when the support for the
state's expanded interpretation of its own constitution, considering
both textual and interpretational differences between the two doc-
uments, is weak or when another solid reason exists for suspecting
that the state court's primary aim in reaching its result was to
avoid a federal minimum level of protection. A sliding scale ap-
proach also allows for the consideration of a state's particular fac-
tual situation, such as its local, geographic, social, and economic
needs and the shared values, traditions, opinions, and history of
its citizenry, in determining whether the state's interests outweigh
the federal interests.97
97. Local conditions have been just as important in assigning weight to state rights
and interests when state courts interpret the federal Constitution as they have been when
state courts interpret their own constitutions. State courts, for example, generally are not
permitted to interpret the federal Constitution to provide broader, more expansive federal
constitutional protections for their citizens than are available throughout the rest of the
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Any discussion of a sliding scale of scrutiny elicits the specter
of the Supreme Court's chaotic and still unresolved treatment of
obscenity and the first amendment. Sliding scale systems are asso-
ciated with the case-by-case approach to the definition of obscen-
ity which has plagued the Court for approximately twenty-five
years.98 There are significant differences, however, between the
Supreme Court's ad hoc approach to the definition of obscenity
and the sliding scale system of scrutiny which has been proposed
above--differences which largely eliminate the problems of uncer-
tain standards, chilling effects, and obscured, confused reasoning
which have haunted the obscenity area of adjudication.99
In an obscenity case, the factual case-by-case determination
necessitates a determination of whether the particular materials in
question are constitutionally "obscene." The dfnitions of obscen-
ity which the Supreme Court has employed in making this deter-
mination have been characterized by broad, generalized
country. See Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975). When the decision is based on local
conditions, however, such expansion has been upheld. See Mulkey v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d
529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966), aft'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See generally Com-
ment, Protecting FundamentalRights in State Courts: Filling a State Peg to a Federal Hole,
12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63, 94-102 (1977) (arguing that generally state courts should
be permitted to expand the federal Constitution's protections). Local conditions also have
been important in state constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Ravin v', State, 537 P.2d
494, 504 (Alaska 1975); Carter v. University of Wash., 85 Wash. 2d 391, 399-400, 536 P.2d
618, 623-24 (1975). See generally Note, OfLaboratories and Liberties, supra note 12, at
558-59 (1976) (discussing influence of regional notions of individual freedom).
98. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977); Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153
(1974); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973); Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767
(1967); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476
(1957).
Justice Harlan warned against an approach requiring case-by-case obscenity determi-
nations as early as 1957. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 497-98 (1957) (Harlan,
J., dissenting). In 1973, the Court attempted to set up a definition which would eliminate
the necessity of federal appellate level case-by-case review of obscenity cases. See Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), where the Court atempted to define obscenity: "A state
offense must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient inter-
est in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and which, taken as a
whole, do not have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24. The
Miller definition, however, has fared no better in that respect than its predecessors. See
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162-65 (1974) (Brennan, J., concurring); Hamling v.
United States, 418 U.S. 87, 145-52 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See generally L. TRjBe,
supra note 82, at 660-70 (Supreme Court obscenity tests discussed).
99. For a summary of the history of such problems in the Supreme Court's obscenity
adjudication between 1957 and 1973, see Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-93
(1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977)
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S.
87, 145-52 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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language-language requiring sensitive, value-laden interpreta-
tion. 1 1 Moreover, a decision whether one particular book, for ex-
ample, is obscene, provides minimal guidance for the next court
considering the same issue with regard to a different book.
A sliding scale system of review for state court decisions, how-
ever, which rebalances conflicting state and federal constitutional
rights and interests bears little similarity to an obscure obscenity
definition. The factors demanding more or less scrutiny are
straightforward and do not require a sensitive interpretation of
vague, generalized language. Those federally guaranteed rights
traditionally requiring strict scrutiny are well-known since contro-
versial issues are, by definition, easily identifiable. The strength of
a state court's justification for interpreting its state constitution
more expansively in regard to a particular individual liberty is de-
termined easily by checking that state's constitutional language
and its prior cases interpreting that language. Moreover, once the
Supreme Court decides whether one federally guaranteed right is
or is not outweighed by a conflicting expansive state constitutional
guarantee, a precedent will have been established within that state
which should not require repeated relitigation to establish its ef-
fectiveness. Such a decision should provide guidance for other
states that will deduce that a similar case in their state will yield a
100. See, for example, the definitions from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)
("(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards' would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest... ; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined
by the applicable state law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious liter-
ary, artistic, political, or scientific value"); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418
(1966) ("three elements must coalesce [in order for the material to be constitutionally 'ob-
scene']: it must be established that (a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to a prudent interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual
matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value"); Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957) ("whether to the average person, applying contemporary
community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to
prurient interest").
Justice Brennan, in criticizing the above definitions, stated:
[Nione of the available formulas... can reduce the vagueness to a tolerable
level .... Any effort to draw a constitutionally acceptable boundary on state
power must resort to such indefinite concepts as "prurient interest," "patent offen-
siveness," "serious literary value," and the like. The meaning of these concepts
necessarily varies with the experience, outlook, and even idiosyncracies of the
person defining them.
Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Marks v.
United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) ("the present constitutional standards... are so intolerably vague that evenhanded
enforcement of the law is a virtual impossibility").
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similar result, unless their particular state's interests are markedly
stronger or weaker than those balanced by the Supreme Court in
the precedent case.
With the foregoing factors in mind-flexibility, the preserva-
tion of careful Supreme Court control over the minimum federal
individual liberty guarantees, a healthy respect for a federalist sys-
tem which protects personal freedoms, and an ability to provide
strong decisions generating guidance for future conflicts-a slid-
ing scale of Supreme Court scrutiny of state decisions which
rebalances conflicting state and federal constitutional guarantees
is highly recommendable. In addition, such a review system
would provide a coherent, understandable approach to these con-
flicts and conform with the "new federalism" encouraged by the
Burger Court.
IV. CONCLUSION
Over the past decade, the Burger Court has emphasized its in-
tention not to continue the Warren Court's revolutionary expan-
sion of the application of the federal Bill of Rights to the states by
incorporation through the fourteenth amendment. The Burger
Court also has shown a tendency to leave. governing power and
responsibility with a state rather than with the federal govern-
ment.10' This recent divergence has resulted in a "new federal-
ism" trend in the area of individual liberties which has manifested
itself through a "rediscovery" of state constitutions. These state
constitutions have been widely interpreted throughout the 1970's
to provide greater protection of various personal liberties than
that provided under the federal Constitution.0" The Supreme
Court has expressly approved this application of state constitu-
tional law to the protection of the personal freedoms of United
States citizens.0 3 Under the adequate state ground doctrine, the
Court has refused to review the state court decisions which have
provided these expansive state constitutional interpretations."1 4
On the other hand, when federal constitutionally guaranteed lib-
erties allegedly have been infringed by a state's application of its
expansively interpreted state constitution, the adequate state
ground doctrine does not apply, and such a decision is review-
101. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 12.
103. See supra note 15.
104. See supra note 73.
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able.' 5 PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 10 6 was an example
of this type of case. The California Supreme Court based its deci-
sion'017 on California's expansive free speech guarantee, and the
petitioner alleged that the California court had infringed hisfed-
eral constitutionally protected fifth amendment private property
rights and his first amendment free speech rights. The United
States Supreme Court, in a straightforward manner, considered
whether those federal rights had been infringed by the California
court's ruling and determined no infringement had occurred. 08
A similar but more troublesome conflict also was suggested by
the Robins case and is soon likely to present itself squarely before
the Supreme Court. In the past, various direct conflicts between
federal constitutionally guaranteed rights have been confronted
by the Supreme Court and resolved through a balancing process
which weighs the conflicting constitutional rights and interests in-
volved and upholds the protection of one federal right at the ex-
pense of the other. If, however, in a subsequent state court case
involving the same conflicting constitutional liberties, one of the
rights being balanced is an expansive state constitutional guaran-
tee (not its more limited federal counterpart), there are strong ar-
guments that a new balancing process should be undertaken and
that a different decision could result." 9 Whether the Supreme
Court will be persuaded by those arguments, or whether it instead
will hold the prior corresponding federal constitutional case to be
binding precedent on the state court, is unclear. Assuming the
Court allows rebalancing by state courts" ° in these situations, a
coherent, understandable approach to the Supreme Court's review
of these state court decisions should be developed.
The approach recommended in this Comment is a sliding scale
type of Supreme Court scrutiny which provides for strict scrutiny
in situations where there is reason to believe that the state court's
primary purpose in engaging in the reweighing process was to
avoid a disfavored federal minimum level of constitutional protec-
tion."' This approach also provides minimal scrutiny to state
court determinations of the proper balance between the conflicting
105. See supra note 74.
106. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
107. Robins v. PruneYard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 592 P.2d 341, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 854 (1979).
108. 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
109. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
110. For an argument that it should, see supra notes 163-66 and accompanying text.
111. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
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state and federal constitutional rights where the state court appar-
ently has interpreted its state constitution in good faith, without
intent to dilute the effectiveness of any federal minimum
guarantees. 1 12
Finally, the sliding scale approach has the advantages of main-
taining close Supreme Court control over the federal Bill of
Rights minimum levels of protection, allowing the Court flex-
ibility in handling these situations, and providing guidance for
subsequent cases. Moreover, the "new federalist" system for the
protection of individual liberties," 13 a system which embraces the
active participation of both federal and state constitutions and
which promises to be with us for many years to come, is extended
and encouraged.
112. See supra notes 90-96 and accompanying text.
113. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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